In Defense of Moral Agents
by Roy Halliday
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The Aristotelian approach to Natural Law, which is based on archetypes and definitions of essences, appeals to libertarians of a philosophical bent such as Ayn Rand and my own mentor, Murray Rothbard. I have read most of Rand's and Rothbard's works as well as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and modern works on Natural Law by d'Entreves, Strauss, Veatch, and others. I have found nothing in these books that persuades me that the archetype approach to moral philosophy is correct. On the contrary, I think it sets moral philosophy off in the wrong direction and quickly leads to futile disputes over the essential nature of man.
Since this approach has little intrinsic merit, I believe its appeal to libertarians lies in the fact that it is one of the few attempts to provide a philosophical basis for natural rights, which, in turn, provide the moral basis of libertarianism. I too believe in natural rights, but if they must have a philosophical foundation, they need a better one than this.
In Formulations, Vol. IV, No.3 ["Dialog on Archetypes"], Roderick Long responded to my attack on the archetype Natural Law philosophy, which was published in the same issue. Roderick deflects my arguments by saying that the Natural Law philosophers do not hold the views that I attack. For example, Roderick agrees with me that it is silly to make moral judgments about animals, plants, and inanimate objects and that it is a mistake to equate physical health and virtue, but he contends that Natural Law philosophers do not make these mistakes. Maybe some of them do not make these mistakes, but Henry Veatch, who is one of the leading proponents of Aristotelian ethics, is critical of unhealthy plants and birds. That is why I included a quotation from him to that effect.
The archetype approach makes no sense to me at all. So, in criticizing it, I tried to interpret it in different ways to see if I could find one that was reasonable. In doing this, I probably attacked some interpretations that have no adherents.
Roderick wrote that in the Aristotelian scheme, reason "is the ability to employ abstract concepts, to grasp the relations among them, and to communicate this understanding to others." This could be a definition of philosophizing. It is not surprising to me that a philosopher such as Aristotle would define reason in this way and then claim that philosophizing is the essential attribute of man and the highest moral good. But while it is understandable that philosophers would define themselves to be the most virtuous, worthy, and admirable of mortals, why should we believe them?
St. Augustine, being a Christian bishop, held that faith rather than reason was the only legitimate tool for investigating man's nature and man's proper ends.
Murray Rothbard, being an economist, chose to define the essential nature of man as a creature who can only live and prosper by his own production and by exchange with other producers.2 This definition leads quickly to the libertarian conclusion that parasitism is against human nature and is therefore wrong.
A child psychologist or pediatrician might define man as the most parasitic of all primates who depends on others for his survival for the first several years of his life. We are not born as rugged individualists and producers. On the contrary, we are born as helpless dependents whose survival depends on the altruistic efforts of others. A moral philosophy based on man's essential dependence on others could lead to a social philosophy quite different from libertarianism.
It is apparent to me that natural law theorists choose the "essential" characteristic of man according to their own personal dispositions and goals. They make the mistake of generalizing from their own interests and attributing those interests to man per se. Instead of sweeping generalizations such as "The essential nature of man is reason (or faith or production and exchange)," we would be closer to the truth if we said, "Aristotle was essentially a rationalist, St. Augustine was essentially a man of faith, and Murray Rothbard was essentially interested in the workings of the free market."
If we grant that these statements capture the essence of Aristotle, Augustine, and Rothbard, we could say that the natural good for these men would be to pursue philosophy, religion, and economics respectively. This would reduce natural law to one of those pop-psychology theories of self-fulfillment that keep making appearances in the best-seller lists.
I propose an approach that treats morality itself rather than self-fulfillment as the goal. In particular, I am interested in justice more than other aspects of morality. In my approach, it isn't necessary to reach agreement on the "essential" nature of man. Since the subject is morality, the relevant aspect of human nature is the fact that people are moral agents, that is, we are creatures who develop moral principles of right and wrong and take these principles into account when we make decisions to act and when we evaluate the actions of others.
The Nature of Moral Agents
What attributes must a creature have to be a moral agent, and what circumstances must such a creature be in so that he can exercise his moral faculty?
Since a moral agent must be able to understand abstract moral principles and be able to apply them in making decisions, a moral agent must be a living creature with self-consciousness, memory, moral principles, other values, and the reasoning faculty, which allows him to devise plans for achieving his objectives, to weigh alternatives, and so on. Secondly, to weigh his options morally he must attach a positive value to acts that conform to his moral principles and a positive value to some of the results that he can achieve by violating his moral principles. (If someone is never in a situation where there is a conflict between his moral principles and his other values, he never has to make moral decisions and he can't be a moral agent.) This means that to be a moral agent you must live in a world of scarcity rather than paradise. (If all your values could be attained instantly, without effort and without sacrifices and trade-offs, you wouldn't have to choose between your moral goals and your nonmoral goals, and you couldn't exercise your moral agency.)
To be the kind of moral agent who makes decisions about justice and takes action based on those decisions, you have to live in a society with others whom you deem to have moral rights. If you live alone or with only creatures that have no rights, then you can't make decisions to respect or to violate anyone's rights, so you can't be just or unjust.
Finally, to exercise your moral faculty meaningfully, you must be free to act. If you are enchained or paralyzed to the point that you cannot act, you cannot have moral responsibility.
The Minimum Morality of Moral Agents
If morality has any meaning and there is such a thing as a moral agent, then that moral agent must have the right to make moral decisions and to take action based on those decisions. If a moral agent has this right, that means that other moral agents must have a duty to respect that right. Since it is illogical to posit conflicting rights, each moral agent's rights must be compatible with the rights of all other moral agents. This leads to the libertarian principle that each moral agent has the right to make moral decisions and to take action based on those decisions as long as he does not violate the equal rights of all other moral agents.
What creature that we all know and love fits this description of a moral agent? I contend that the normal adult human fits this description, regardless of what preference you have for his "essential" definition.
Normal adult humans are creatures
with self-consciousness, memories, moral principles, other values, and
the reasoning faculty, who live in a world of scarcity in societies with
others of their own kind. This makes them moral agents who have the natural
right to make their own moral decisions in freedom. D
1 For an Ontology of Morals pp. 7-8.
2 The Ethics of Liberty p.49.