This article was published in the Summer/Autumn 2000 issue of Formulations
formerly a publication of the Free Nation Foundation,
now published by the Libertarian Nation Foundation

Anarchy, State, and Mixture, Part I:

Six Possibilities

by Roderick T. Long

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The new libertarian nation toward which we work should have a constitutional structure that combines aspects of government with aspects of anarchy. There are two reasons for this. First, such a compromise is more likely to inspire libertarians of both minarchist and anarchist persuasions to collaborate in the establishment of the new nation. Second, as an anarchist myself, I am convinced that a free nation will need to be fairly anarchistic in order to remain free; but I also concede that such a nation will need to be able to show a governmental face to the world (as well as to some of its inhabitants, especially if the free nation starts off with an indigenous non-libertarian population) in order to maintain its legitimacy.

There are a number of different (not necessarily mutually exclusive) ways of combining governmental with anarchistic features in a single legal system. One suggestion I’ve made in the past is to have a federal structure in which the central authority was the government but in which the local jurisdictions were competing, non-territorially-based "virtual cantons." Another is to have the national government renounce all governmental power but still use governmental language, and make paying taxes a condition of citizenship. Still another is to have an inner region of anarchy protected by a surrounding buffer zone of government. Which of these methods, if any, is most appropriate to the new nation will depend on the particular circumstances of its formation.

I now wish to suggest yet another way in which aspects of both state and anarchy can be combined into a single system.

A legal system is any institution or set of institutions in a given society that adjudicates conflicting claims and secures compliance in a formal, systematic, and orderly way. A government is a legal system that claims, and in large part achieves, a coercive monopoly on the use of force to adjudicate claims and secure compliance in a given territorial area. So government is, in effect, a monopolistic legal system. But a legal system has three main functions:

"The judicial function is the core of any legal system. In its judicial function, a legal system adjudicates disputes, issuing a decision as to how the disagreement should be settled. The other two functions are merely adjuncts to this central function.

The purpose of the legislative function is to determine the rules that will govern the process of adjudication. Legislation tells the judicial function how to adjudicate. The legislative process may be distinct from the judicial process, as when the Congress passes laws and the Supreme Court then applies them; or the two processes may coincide, as when a common-law body of legislation arises through a series of judicial precedents.

Finally, the purpose of the executive function is to ensure, first, that the disputing parties submit to adjudication in the first place, and second, that they actually comply with the settlement eventually reached through the judicial process. In its executive function the legal system may rely on coercive force, voluntary social sanctions, or some combination of the two. The executive function gives a legal system its ‘teeth,’ providing incentives for peaceful behavior; both domestic law enforcement and national defense fall under the executive function."
 
 

If all three functions are monopolized, the legal system is clearly a government. If all three functions are open to competitive provision, the legal system is clearly an anarchy. But what if some of the functions are monopolized and some are not? In that case, we have a blend of government with anarchy.

There are six possible intermediate combinations:

A. legislative monopoly
     judicial monopoly
     executive competition

B. legislative monopoly
     judicial competition
     executive monopoly

C. legislative competition
     judicial monopoly
     executive monopoly

D. legislative monopoly
     judicial competition
     executive competition

E. legislative competition
    judicial monopoly
    executive competition

F. legislative competition
    judicial competition
    executive monopoly

Of these six possibilities, A and D are the most frequent historically. But each is a possibility. In future installments I shall consider the potential benefits and drawbacks of each. D

To be continued

Roderick T. Long is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University. He has been a small-L libertarian since 1979, a big-L Libertarian since 1987, and an anarcho-capitalist since 1991. (What took him so long?) He can be contacted at <longrob@auburn.edu>, and his webpage is <www.geocities.com/BerserkRL>.

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